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Comment and Casenotes
LIMITATIONS ON EVEN-YEAR
LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS
By J. KEMP

I.

BARTLETt, III*

THE NEED FOR EVEN-YEAR SESSIONS

The adoption of an amendment to the Constitution of
Maryland by the voters of the State at the General Election
in November, 1948, brought about a marked change in the
legislative procedure of the General Assembly of Maryland.
This amendment provided that the General Assembly
should convene for an annual session of thirty days duration in each even year, in addition to the traditional ninetyday sessions in odd years. The constitutional amendment
contained a series of restrictions upon the type and character of legislation that could properly be enacted during the
newly created "short session".
Despite a determined effort to clarify these restrictions
prior to the first meeting of the thirty-day session, there
remained considerable confusion in the minds of legislators
during the Session of 1950 as to what authority had actually
been vested in them by virtue of the amendment. Much of
this confusion has been cleared up by court decisions which
have construed the constitutional limitations imposed upon
the thirty-day sessions. As a result of this judicial interpretation subsequent even year meetings of the General Assembly should be conducted with fewer doubts than in 1950.
Until 1950 the General Assembly of Maryland convened
for a session of ninety days every two years. It was, therefore, necessary that the State Budget for the next two
fiscal years following the adjournment of the General
Assembly be estimated, submitted, and enacted for a period
in excess of two years. In reality, since the Governor is
required to submit the budget to the General Assembly
within twenty days of its convening and since the General
Assembly convened only on the first Wednesday of January
of the odd numbered years,' the State Budget had to be
* A.B., Princeton University, 1948; third year student, University of Maryland School of Law.
'MD. CONST., Art. 17, Sec. 6.
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estimated at least thirty months before the conclusion of the
fiscal period which ended on June 30 two years following.
With the trend toward extended governmental activity
manifesting itself in the past two decades and because of
continually fluctuating economic conditions, the task of
accurately estimating the State's budgetary requirements
for such a protracted period became increasingly more difficult. Despite an adequate and experienced budget staff,
this problem of predicting financial conditions and revenue
needs for a period in excess of thirty months did not lend
itself to a sound State fiscal policy.
In 1946 this problem was studied at length by the Maryland Commission on the Distribution of Tax Revenues
(Sherbow Commission) which had been asked by Governor
Herbert R. O'Conor "to determine proper State and local
relationships with specific reference to the division of revenues".' The Commission report, made on September 30,
1946, stated in part as follows:
"Greatly improved estimating can be attained by
putting the State budget on an annual instead of a biennial basis and by moving the time for submitting the
budget to the Legislature nearer to the opening of the
fiscal year. The increasing necessity of budgeting with
the greatest possible accuracy would seem to make
annual sessions of the Legislature indispensable. Once
a year is certainly not too often in these days for a
state government to review its financial plan and to
vote its budget.... The long range estimates, which are
often inaccurate, would be more realistic, and the need
made would be
for budget amendments, so frequently
3
lessened and perhaps eliminated."
The Commission concluded its report upon this subject
with the following recommendation: "The Commission
recommends annual sessions of the General Assembly to
consider the State budget on a yearly basis."4
It should be noted that the Commission did not consider
nor did it make any recommendation as to any limitation
to be placed on legislation to be considered during the proposed annual session other than that there should be a
yearly review and enactment of the budget. It would appear
that the Commission contemplated placing no restrictions
Report of the Commission on the Distribution of Tax Revenues, September 30, 1946, p. 1.
Ibid, 11-13.
Ibid, 155.
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or qualifications upon other legislation to be introduced and
enacted and that the legislative session in the even-numbered years would be open to all types of general, local, and
special legislation, with the only variance from the regular
session in the odd-numbered years being one of duration.
In this respect the Commission suggested that the new
session should convene at the call of the Governor not later
than March 1 and should adjourn not later than May 15.
After being published on September 30, 1946, the report
of the Maryland Commission on the Distribution of Tax
revenues was submitted to the Legislative Council, in order
that its recommendations could be further studied and that
bills embodying these recommendations could be drafted
and presented to the General Assembly during the 1947
Session which was to convene on the first of January. The
Legislative Council prepared a bill incorporating the main
recommendations of the Commission regarding an annual
session of the General Assembly.' This proposed bill provided that:
"(1) The General Assembly shall meet on the first
Wednesday in March, nineteen hundred and fifty, and
on the same day in every second year thereafter.
"(2) The General Assembly may continue its session.., for a period not longer than.., forty-five days
in even years.

"(3) . .. On the first Wednesday in March in even
numbered years, the Governor shall submit to the General Assembly
a Budget for the next ensuing fiscal
6
year."1
As such an enactment required an amendment to Article
3, Sections 14, 15 and 52, of the Constitution of Maryland,
the bill contained a section providing that the proposed
amendment be submitted to the voters of Maryland for
their adoption or rejection at the next General Election
which was to be held in November, 1948.1
In drafting this legislation, the Legislative Council
leaned heavily upon the report and recommendation of the
Maryland Commission on the Distribution of Tax Revenues.
As in the Commission's report, the bill contained no restriction nor qualification upon the character of legislation to
be considered at the session in the even-numbered years.
5Proposed Bills Submitted to the General Assembly of 1947, Vol. 2.
4 Senate Bill #64 (1947).
'MD. CONST., Art. 14.
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The only difference between the two sessions was that in the
even-numbered years the budget was to be submitted on
the first day of the session and the General Assembly was
not to be in session longer than forty-five days. Except for
these slight deviations, sessions in both even and odd-numbered years would be identical.
The proposal of the Legislative Council was introduced
in the General Assembly as Senate Bill #64 sponsored by
the President of the Senate, as is the custom with all bills
which are presented by the Legislative Council for introduction in the Senate. Senate Bill #64 was introduced on January 3, 1947, and was referred to the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments.'
Thus, the question of whether Maryland should have an
annual session of the General Assembly for the primary
purpose of enacting a yearly budget was put squarely before
the State legislators.
II.

LIMITATIONS IMPOSED IN PROVIDING FOa

EVEN-YEAR SESSIONS

As is the case with any legislative body whose session is
limited in length, the General Assembly of Maryland is
subject to constant criticism because of the inevitable logjam of legislation that piles up during the closing hours of
the session. Bills that have rested in Committee during the
early stages are rushed to the floor during the end of the
session in order to procure enactment. Legislators are kept
busy day and night, and as a result it is impossible that due
consideration be given to all measures. Undesirable legislation is sometimes washed through in the virtual flood that
engulfs the General Assembly in its closing days.
To avoid a similar development during the proposed
short session, it was suggested that, since the primary purpose of holding an annual session of the General Assembly
was to place the State budget upon an annual basis, there
should be imposed some restrictions upon the type of legislation, other than the budget, which could be considered at
the shorter session. It was thought that with such a restriction in effect more time could be given to the consideration
of the budget and to matters which concerned the entire
State. It was further hoped that the closing hours of the
shorter session would be more orderly than those of the
ninety-day session with an opportunity for closer surveillance.
8 This committee has, since, been dropped as a standing committee of the
Senate. See Rules of the Senate of Maryland, #23, 10.
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For these reasons when:the Committee on Constitutional
Amendments reported Senate Bill. #64 back to the floor
of the Senate on March 11, 1947, the following amendment
had been annexed to the Committee's favorable report:
"The General Assembly may continue its session so
long as in its judgment the public interest may require,
for a period not longer than . . . thirty days- in even
years ....
In any of said thirty day sessions in even
years, the General Assembly shall consider no bills
other than (1) Bills having to do with budgetary, reveL
nue and financial matters of the State Government, (2)
legislation dealing with an acute emergency, and (3)
legislation in the general public welfare."9
An amendment was further added to change the date of
convening from the first Wednesday in March to the first
Wednesday in February.
The Committee's favorable report as amended was
adopted by the Senate and on March 15, 1947, Senate Bill
#64 passed its third reading in the Senate by a vote of 27
to 0.10 The bill then went to the House of Delegates where
it was passed by a unanimous vote" without further amendment and on April 16, 1947, the bill was approved by the
Governor as Chapter 497 of the Laws of Maryland of 1947.
The question as to whether Article 3, Sections 14, 15 and
52, of the Constitution of Maryland should be amended in
order to provide for an annual session of the General Assembly was submitted to the voters of the State at the General
Election on Tuesday, November 2, 1948. At this election
197,777 votes were cast in favor of the proposed amendment
while 55,997 votes were cast against the adoption of the
amendment. 2 Thus by a vote of almost four-to-one the
voters of Maryland approved the Constitutional amendment
providing for an annual session of the General Assembly
to enact the budget, with restrictions to be imposed upon
the type of legislation to be considered in the thirty-day
session in the even-numbered years.
III. CONSTRUCTION BY ATroRNEY GEERAL
After the regular ninety day session adjourned in April,
1949, it became necessary to establish with some degree of
certainty "'the kind of legislation which should be sub' Md. Laws, 1947, Ch. 497, p. 888.
101947 Senate Journal, March 15, 1947, 1505.
n 1947 House Journal, March. 22, 1947, 2575.
IMd. Laws 1949, p. 1986.
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mitted by the Legislative Council at the 1950 Session of the
General Assembly . . . as well as the kind of legislation
which the General Assembly should also consider' under
Article 3, Section 15 of the Constitution of Maryland as

amended .

.

.- 13

An opinion of the Attorney General was

sought by Dr. Horace E. Flack, Secretary and Director of
Research for the Legislative Council and the Attorney General's answer was returned on July 5, 1949.
The Attorney General presumed "that the first classification (bills having to do with budgetary, revenue and financial matters of the State government) presents little difficulty". 4 The opinion stated that such financial matters
must necessarily pertain to the entire State and in order for
purely local financial matters to be considered, such matters
"must come within the purview of the phrase 'acute emergency' to justify their consideration"."
The problem as to what constituted "an acute emergency" was more troublesome. The Attorney General
pointed out that there is a conflict in the United States as
to whether a legislative declaration that an emergency
exists is reviewable by the courts.1 6 Concerning this point
the Court of Appeals has ruled, in passing, that ". . . the
question of whether or not an emergency in fact exists is a
question for the Legislature, and its determination is final
and not subject to review by the courts". 7 The Attorney
General's opinion states as follows concerning this holding
of the Court of Appeals:
"The language of the 1948 amendment is different 'legislation dealing with an acute emergency' - and
we think it has a different meaning. We think the intent is that an acute emergency must exist in fact. But
where does the power to determine the fact lie? The
people have not vested it in the Courts. Ordinarily, the
Legislature determines whether or not facts exist which
warrant their action ....
There is simply no provision
in the Constitutional amendment for any other rule
here. We think the reasoning of the cases holding that
the legislative finding is not subject to judicial review
is the sounder. We must rely on the good faith of the
Legislature; and if broken, the remedy is at the polls."' 8
34 Op. Att. Gen. 130, 130.
u

i,

131.

Ibid, 135.
7 A. L. R. 519, 110 A. L. R. 1435.
17 Culp v. Chestertown, 154 Md. 620, 623, 141 A. 410 (1928) ; cited in Everstine, The Legislative Process in Maryland, 10 Md. L. Rev. 91, 133 (1949).
134 Op. Att. Gen. 130, 132.
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The opinion, however, went on to state that it was possible
that under the wording of the Constitutional amendment,
the courts might hold that a legislative declaration of an
acute emergency is reviewable, but that such a ruling
should be "within the realm of construction, not factfinding"."9
The Attorney General felt that the third category legislation in the general public welfare - was subject to
considerations similar to those applicable to "an acute emergency", but in this respect the opinion stated that "there is
more room for judicial construction than in the determination of the existence of an emergency".2 The opinion cited
two Supreme Court decisions2 1 which drew a distinction
between "general" welfare and "local" welfare, and argued
that these decisions should be the basis of interpreting the
Constitutional amendment. However, the opinion declared
that "the mere label 'Public General Law', when the patently intended effect is purely local or special, ought not of
itself satisfy the constitutional requirement"." The court
would thus be able to look behind the wording of a statute
in order to determine whether the subject of the statute
encompassed the entire state (general welfare) or merely
was applicable to a local situation (local welfare). In summarizing upon this point the opinion stated:
"The limitations inherent in the phrase 'in the general public welfare' would obviously seem to preclude
the consideration under this restriction of local legislation in all save the very rarest cases where such legislation could be held to be for the welfare not of the
particular community involved, but of the State as a
whole."2
Thus the Attorney General interpreted the constitutional amendment which created and limited a thirty-day
session of the General Assembly in even-numbered years as
follows:
(1) Bills having to do with budgetary and financial matters of the State Government must necessarily deal solely
with financial matters of the State Government. In order
for financial matters of a local subdivision to qualify under
-Ibid, 133.
2 Ibid.
m U. S. v. Bu.tler, 297 U. S. 1, 67 (1936) ; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619,

640 (1937).
34 Op. Att. Gen. 130, 134.
Ibid, 135.
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the constitutional amendment, it would have to be under
the clause requiring an acute emergency to exist.
(2) Legislation dealing with an acute emergency might
possibly be reviewable by the court upon the basis of construction, but the fact-finding interpretation should still be
the function of the legislature, and this function should not
be encroached upon by the courts.
(3) Legislation in the general public welfare means
"Public General Law" (legislation which concerns the State
as a whole or a considerable segment thereof) as opposed
to "Public Local Law" (legislation whose subject matter
deals with only one local subdivision). In this respect the
court should have wide power of construction in order to
look behind these labels.
The Attorney General felt that the responsibility for
conducting the short session of the General Assembly in the
spirit of the constitutional amendment should be largely
borne by the legislators themselves. In summarizing the
broader aspects of the new session the Attorney General's
opinion stated:
"Obviously, it is the mandate of the people, whom
the Legislature represents, that there shall be restrictions on the legislation which the people's representatives have been given authority to pass. Essentially and
primarily it is the obligation of the individual members
of the Legislature, and the Legislature as a collective
body, to act within the bounds and limits of the authority given them by those they represent."2 4
IV.

CHANGES IN LESasLATVE RuLEs

In order to implement the opinion of the Attorney General in regard to the type of legislation to be considered
during the thirty-day session, the Legislative Council
drafted an amendment to the Rules both of the Senate and
of the House of Delegates. The proposed amendment stated
that the Senate and the House of Delegates should consider
no bills other than those classified in the constitutional
amendment. So that this rule would have a more practical application the Legislative Council's proposal further
stated:
"Thirty-day Sessions .... Upon introduction, every
bill, except the Budget Bill, shall be referred to the
Rules Committee. The Rules Committee shall consider
" Ibid.
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each such bill and shall promptly report to the Senate
[House] every bill which comes within the terms of
this Rule [i.e., the requirements of the constitutional
amendment], with the recommendation that it be, recommitted to the appropriate standing or special committee; any bill which in subject matter does not come
within the terms of this Rule shall be held in the Rules
Committee." 5
This amendment was adopted by both Houses when the
General Assembly convened for the first annual session on
February 1, 1950.
The Rules Committees thus achieved a high degree of
importance in directing the course of the thirty-day session
and a great deal of the responsibility for carrying out the
provisions of the constitutional amendment fell upon these
two committees. In the Senate the Rules Committee consists of three Senators, the President, the majority floor
leader, and the minority floor leader,26 while in the House
of Delegates the Rules Committee is made up of five members, the Speaker, the majority
floor leader, the minority
7
floor leader, and two others.1
Action by the Rules Committee was not absolutely conclusive in that both Houses left loop-holes in their Rules
which allowed a bill to be brought out of the Rules Committee by petition if the commitee did not report the bill
within seven days of its introduction. The Senate required
the signatures of five Senators in order to bring out, by
petition, a bill from the Rules Committee2 8 while it was
necessary to obtain the signatures of at least twenty members in the House of Delegates.2
It was hoped that the Rules Committee's function would
be one of screening, and that bills which did not meet the
necessary requirements would be retained in the Committee, thus freeing the other commitees from the labor and
responsibility of determining whether a bill came within
the constitutional qualification. It was further hoped that
the function of the Rules Committee would greatly reduce
the number of bills that would be brought before the General Assembly and thus effect a more orderly consideration
of legislation and a less crowded calendar.
2 Rules of the Senate #38, p. 18. Rules of the House of Delegates #38,
p. 18.
2 Rules of the Senate #23
(N.), p. 11.
' Rules of the House of Delegates #23 (M.), p. 11.
28 Rules of the Senate #45,
p. 25.
21Rules of the House of Delegates #45, p. 25.
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SESSION

During the 1950 thirty-day session of the General Assembly, 34230 bills were introduced, 160 being Senate Bills and
182 being introduced in the House of Delegates. This total
includes the Budget Bill which was introduced simultaneously in both Houses and was referred to the appropriate
committees
without action by the Rules Committee.
The remaining
159 bills in the Senate were introduced,
read the first time, and referred to the Rules Committee.
Of these 159 bills the Rules Committee felt that 116 came
within the constitutional requirement governing the thirtyday session and these bills were reported back to the Senate
and recommitted to the various Senate 'committees. One
bill was brought out of the Rules Committee by petition,
and the remaining 42 bills died in the Committee.
. In the House of Delegates the Rules Committee reported
back 105 bills leaving 76 bills in the Committee as not being
within the scope of the constitutional amendment. Eight
bills were removed from the House Rules Committee by
petition.
Thus a total of 231 bills (Budget Bills included) were
brought before the consideration of the General Assembly.
It was not required that a bill passed by one House be
screened by the Rules Committee of the other House
although such a further check was suggested. A bill was
only required to be approved by the Rules Committee of
the House in which the bill was originally introduced.
Of the total of 231 bills before the General Assembly 117
bills did not survive the process of the legislative procedure
and died at various points in the ordinary course of the six
required readings. This left a total of 114 bills which were
passed by both Houses and then submitted to the Governor
for his approval. The Governor signed 109 bills and vetoed 5.
Considering the natural restraint that many members of
the General Assembly felt in attempting to abide by the
requirements for the short session and not flood the hoppers
of both Houses with local legislation, the results are rather
noteworthy. One hundred eight new laws plus the budget
for the next fiscal year were added, this figure being only
31% of the total bills introduced, and a percentage far
smaller than that of the recent biennial sessions.
OAll statistics are supplied by the Department of Legislative Reference.
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JUDIcIAL INTEFRPRErATION

During the period between June 1, 1950, the date upon
which legislation enacted at the 1950 Session took effect
and January 3, 1951, when the regular ninety-day session
convened, three suits were brought for the purpose of
obtaining judicial interpretation of the constitutional limitations imposed upon the thirty-day session. The opinions
rendered in these three cases represent the first concrete
steps to dispel the confusion and lack of certainty that surrounded the initial short session. These decisions will have
a very positive effect and will act as guide posts in marking
the course for subsequent sessions.
One of these suits was instituted in the Circuit Court
No. 2 of Baltimore City by four corporations engaged in
the contracting business who were performing contracts
with the State of Maryland. This suit was brought for the
purpose of declaring Chapter 30 of the Laws of 1950 unconstitutional as in violation of the constitutional provision
requiring legislation in the thirty-day session to be in the
general public welfare.
The statute in question stated:
"There is hereby created a commission, to be known
as the 'Commission on Prevailing Wages for the State
of Maryland', whose duty it shall be to fix and determine, from time to time, the generally prevailing wage
rates in the different areas or localities within the State
of Maryland."31
The statute further set a standard for determining the
number of hours constituting a week's work upon contracts
to be performed for the State, and also vested in the newly
created Commission the power to determine the rate of
per diem wages in various areas or localities throughout the
State. A provision was provided to enforce the actions of
the Commission by the inclusion of a section establishing a
penalty to be invoked upon violators of the Commission's
orders.
Section 81 of the statute contained one most important
provision.3 2 This provision stated:
"... Nothing in this section shall be construed to
repeal or modify in any respect the provisions of Section 7A of Article 89B of the Annotated Code of Mary"Md.

Laws 1960, Ch. 30, p. 281.
= Ibid. 283.
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land (1947 Supplement) as said Section 7A applies to
contracts by the State Roads Commission for road
work.""3
The net result of this clause was to exempt Allegany
County, Garrett County, and Washington County from the
provisions of Chapter 30, Laws of 1950.
Upon this point the plaintiffs based their bill against the
defendant newly-created Commission on Prevailing Wages
for the State of Maryland, asserting that Chapter 30 was not
legislation in the general public welfare despite the fact
that it was a public general law. A decree was rendered
by the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City declaring the
Act unconstitutional and from this decree the defendant
appealed.
After establishing the right of the complainants to bring
this bill, the Court of Appeals stated:
"The first contention we are called upon to consider is the authority of the General Assembly to pass
such an Act as Chapter 30 at the short session of 1950. '"1,
The court then briefly reviewed the background and the
development of the "short Session" and concluded that the
primary purpose of such a session was to enact an annual
budget and that the General Assembly "has no authority
to pass any legislation at such sessions other than that
enumerated [in the constitutional amendment]".'
The appellants did not contend that Chapter 30 would
qualify as a budgetary measure or as legislation dealing
with an acute emergency, but it was their claim that this
law came within the meaning of legislation in the general
public welfare.
1 Section 7A of Article 89B of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1947
Supplement) states:
"In all cases where a contract for work shall be given out to a private
contractor by the State Roads Commission, the Commission shall require
that not less than the prevailing wage rates of the locality in which the
work is to be done, be paid to all skilled and unskilled labor.
"The prevailing wage rates, for the purposes of this section, shall be
predetermined wage rates as filed with the United States Department
of Labor.
"The provisions of this section shall not apply to work to be done
in Anne Arundel County, Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Calvert
County, Caroline County, Carroll County, Cecil County, Charles County.
Dorchester County, Frederick County, Harford County, Howard County,
Kent County, Montgomery County, Prince George's County, Queen
Anne's County, St. Mary's County, Somerset County, Talbot County,
Wicomico County, and Worcester County."
MFunk v. Mullan, 78 A. 2d 632, 635 (1951).
Ibid, 636, material in brackets supplied.
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To this contention the Court stated:
"Every measure passed by a legislature is supposed
to be in the public welfare, whether the Act is local,
general, or special. It is obvious, therefore, that had the
term been merely 'public welfare' instead of 'general
public welfare', the doors would have been wide open.
Something was meant by the use of the word 'general',
and it becomes our duty to interpret that word as used
in the constitutionalamendment. We think that should
be done... in the light or well known public conditions
existing at the time of its adoption." 6
By "well known public conditions" the Court meant the
vast amount of local legislation that swamps the General
Assembly in its closing days and necessitates crowded calendars and lengthy day and night sessions in which legislators are subject to "deals and trades".37 It was just this sort
of evil, the Court thought, that resulted in the restrictions
being imposed on the short session. Upon this point the
Court stated:
"We conclude, therefore, that by the use of the word
'general', the Legislature meant to restrict itself in
these sessions to matters generally affecting the State,
rather than affecting parts thereof."3'
The Court took notice of the fact that the appellant was
represented by the Attorney General who had rendered the
opinion upon the short session of the General Assembly
just a year prior. The Court did not feel that the general
public welfare was synonymous with a public general law
and in this respect differed sharply with the Attorney
General.
The Court next dwelt upon the statute itself and closely
examined the authority that was granted to the Commission on Prevailing Wages, and noted that while the statute
had application to Baltimore City and twenty counties,
three counties were exempt from the authority of the newly
created Commission. This exemption amounted to a fatal
defect in the constitutionality of Chapter 30, Laws of 1950,
even though it was clearly a general public law which the
court defined as "any law so drawn as to apply to two or
more of the geographical sub-divisions of this state"29
NIbid.
Ibid.
Ibid, 637. See also CONST., Art. 11A, Sec. 4.
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In concluding upon the question of general public welfare the Court said:
"It was not intended, therefore, that the Legislature
could pass only public general laws, nor can it be held
that it can pass any sort of law, provided it is a public
general law. We think the term 'general', as used in
Section 15 of Article 3 of the Constitution, is intended
to mean legislation that applies to all of the State without exception. Were it not so intended, it would be an
entirely useless provision. A public general law might
be passed affecting two or more counties or from which
any number of counties, or the City, might be excepted,
although the subject might affect them all ....
Thus,
any amount of local legislation might be passed in that
form, and the entire purpose of the restriction which
we have heretofore discussed would be thwarted."4
For these reasons the majority of the Court of Appeals
found that Chapter 30 did not come within the constitutional
restrictions governing the short sessions and the decree of
the lower Court was affirmed.
A dissenting opinion was rendered by Judge Henderson." This dissent argued that, while the three counties
were exempt from the authority of the Act in question,
these three counties were actually controlled in a similar
manner through a Federal agency. This exemption, the
dissent stated, was not a sufficient variation in order to
destroy the "general" character and application of the Act
to the State as a whole. Judge Henderson concluded his
opinion as follows:
"To my mind the generality of the legislation is not
destroyed by a geographical variation in detail that
accomplishes the ultimate purpose in a slightly different way. I think
the constitutionality of the Act should
42
be sustained.
Another suit was brought for the purpose of interpreting
Chapter 93, Laws of 1950.
This Act applied solely to Montgomery and Prince
George's Counties and pertained to the Washington Suburban Sanitary District which had been created by prior
legislative authority. The main provision of Chapter 93,
stated:
,0 Supra. n. 34, 637-638.
U179 A. 2d 152 (1951).
2Ibid.

153.

138
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"On and after July 1st, 1950, the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission shall make all water and
sewer house connections from the water main or sewer
to the property line of the abutting lot . .. , and no
plumber shall after said date make any house connections; except as agent or contractor for the said Commission.""
The Act contained the following emergency clause:
"And be it further enacted, That this Act is hereby
declared to be on [sic] acute emergency measure and
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
health and safety,...""
The plaintiffs, as citizens, taxpayers, and master plumbers licensed and registered within the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission brought suit in the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County against the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, seeking to have Chapter 93 declared unconstitutional as in violation of the provisions
governing the short session of the General Assembly.
After having reviewed the provisions of Chapter 93 and
the background of the thirty-day Session, Judge Charles C.
Marbury of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County,
stated:
"Having determined that the constitutional amendment embodies limitations as to the character of the
legislative matters that may be considered at the even
year sessions, the question then arises as to whether the
courts of this State may scrutinize and test the action of
the Legislature as limited by the provisions of the
amendment itself. The Court's conclusion is that it
does have the duty and power under the 1948 amendment .... To hold otherwise would be to declare that
the restrictive clauses are meaningless so that any and
all legislation might be passed at the short sessions
just as at the regular odd year sessions of the Legislature.",,5
The opinion pointed out that the defendant admitted by
demurrer that an acute emergency in fact did not exist.
Md. Laws 1950, Ch. 93, p. 422.
"Ibid, 423.
4Daniel F. Buckley, et al. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,
Daily Record, August 1, 1950.
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Counsel for the defendant later readily conceded that there
was no acute emergency despite the legislative declaration,
but relied upon the ruling by the Court of Appeals in Culp
v. Chestertoum, which held that a legislative declaration of
an emergency was not reviewable by the Court as a fact
finder.
Judge Marbury thought that there was a distinction between an ordinary" emergency as contemplated in Culp v.
Chestertoum and an acute4 7 emergency as provided in the
constitutional amendment. He cited a decision by the Court
of Appeals in which the Court had reviewed the facts constituting an emergency where legislative authority had
been granted to borrow a sum of money for "any emergency" arising from the necessity of maintaining the police
or preserving the health, safety, and sanitary condition of
a city. 48 This later situation seemed more analogous to the
provisions of the 1948 constitutional amendment, and would
thus allow judicial interpretation of a declaration of an
acute emergency without disturbing the prior decision
which was applicable to ordinary emergencies.
In concluding upon this point, the opinion stated:
"The Court therefore holds that under the pleadings,
Chapter 93 does not
concessions, and by construction
4
deal with an acute emergency.'
The Court then discussed the possibility of Chapter 93
being considered to be legislation in the general public welfare. Upon this point the opinion stated:
"It would... seem that the term 'public general'
when used in defining 'welfare' was intended to mean
legislation affecting the state as a whole or a considerable segment thereof in contrast to legislation affecting
a particular county or portions of two counties. It
would require a strained construction upon the Constitutional provision in question to hold that an Act changing the law with reference to making water and sewer
house connections within the sanitary district comprising portions of two counties could possibly affect the
'general public welfare' of the State."5
Supra, n. 17.
'Italics supplied.
' Baltimore v. Hofrichter, 178 Md. 91, 11 A. 2d 375 (1940).
"Daily Record, August 1, 1950.
- Ibid.
'
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Thus, because Chapter 93 could satisfy none of the
three constitutional provisions, the defendant's demurrer
was overruled and the Act was declared unconstitutional.
From this decree, the defendants appealed.
After reviewing the provisions of Chapter 93 and the
situation that led to the passage of this Act, the Court of
Appeals determined that the sole issue involved was the
legislative authority to enact such legislation. Thus Chapter
93 would necessarily have to fall within the category of
an acute emergency or legislation in the general public
welfare.
The Court felt that clearly the "general public welfare"
was not involved, saying:
"It cannot be successfully contended that a purely
local statute, affecting only two parts of two counties,
and having no application, either financial or otherwise,
to any other part of the State, can be in the general
public welfare."5 '
Thus the only real question for the Court was whether an
acute emergency existed and whether the Court had the
power to rule upon this point.
The opinion stated:
"It is, of course, one of the well recognized powers
of the courts to determine the constitutionality of
legislation, and it is the province and duty of the courts
to interpret the Constitution and to construe its provisions in order to ascertain its applicability to a given
statute." . . . In this case, we have a declaration by the
Legislature that an acute emergency exists, and we
have to determine whether this prevents the courts
from deciding otherwise.""
The Court noted the decision in CuIp v. Chestertown,
which had held that a legislative declaration of an emergency was conclusive, but drew a distinction between this
situation and that pertaining to the thirty-day Session because the legislative power so to declare was drawn from
different sections of the Constitution.5 4 The Court felt that
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Buckley, et al., 78 A. 2d
638,641 (1951).
Citing Hillman v. Stockett, 183 Md. 641, 645, 39 A. 2d 803 (1944).
Supra, n. 51, 641.
"Article 16, Section 2, was construed in Culp v. Chestertown, supra, n. 17,
while Article 3, Section 15, was before the Court in Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission v. Buckley, supra,n. 51.
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Article 11, section 7, was closer in analogy to Article 3, section 15, than was Article 16, section 2, and that in construing
the former on several occasions5 5 the Court had held that:
" 'Primarily a legislative finding is sufficient but,
except where the power to determine the question is
specifically granted as in Article 16, section 2 .. ., by
no means conclusive proof that an emergency exists....
Such a finding is, however, always entitled to great
weight and will not be set aside or annuled unless it
clearly and unmistakably appears that it is erroneous.'
(Emphasis supplied.) "I'
By this the court meant that the decision of Culp v.
Chestertown, applicable to Article 16, section 2, had no binding effect in an interpretation of Article 11, section 7, or of
Article 3, section 15, the latter of which controlled the Short
Sessions of the General Assembly.
The Court could find no hint of an emergency and the
wording of the very statute itself seemed to clearly show
that there was not even an ordinary emergency. The pleadings of the case and the appellant's counsel's admission were
held to be conclusive upon this point.
In closing, the opinion stated:
"Section 15 (of Article 3 of the Constitution) unlike
the referendum section, (Section 2 of Article 16) does
not predicate any result upon the declaration of an
emergency, and we think it means... that there must
be an actual acute emergency to render the legislation
valid, and that' '57
this emergency is one to be determined
by the courts.
For these reasons the Court ruled that Chapter 93 did
not satisfy the constitutional provisions governing the short
session of the General Assembly and the decree of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County was affirmed.
A third suit was brought in order to determine the constitutionality of Chapter 32, Laws of 1950.58 This act empowered the Town of North Beach, Calvert County, to borrow a sum of money not to exceed $250,000 "for the purpose
of constructing a sewerage system for said town, and a
Norris v. Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, 192 A. 631 (1937) ; Geisendaffer v.
Baltimore, 176 Md. 150, 3 A. 2d 860, 4 A. 2d 460 (conc. op.) (1939) ; City of
Baltimore v. Hofrichter, supra, n. 48.
Supra, n. 51, 642, citing Norris v. Baltimore, ibid.
Supra, n. 51, 642; material in brackets supplied.
Shaw, et al. v. North Beach, et al., Daily Record, October 6, 1950.
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water supply and a water distribution system for said
town ....
,59 The Act also authorized the Town of North
Beach to levy a tax upon the assessable property therein in
order to pay the principal and interest on the proposed loan.
Chapter 32 contained an emergency clause similar to the
clause in Chapter 93 declaring an acute emergency to exist.
Suit was brought in the Circuit Court for Calvert County
by a group of taxpayers of North Beach in order to restrain
the town and its officers from borrowing money in pursuance of the provisions of Chapter 32. The only issue involved was whether the General Assembly possessed the
authority to enact such legislation in the Short Session of
1950.
Judge John B. Gray, Jr., in delivering the opinion of the
trial court reviewed the factual situation that had led to
the passage of the Act in question. He pointed out that the
disposal of sewerage and the possibility of pollution of the
water supply was not a new problem to the residents of
North Beach, and that there had been little new construction. This condition had existed for a number of years, and
a proposed bond issue to remedy this very situation had
been rejected by the voters in a special election in 1949.
Under these circumstances Judge Gray had difficulty
in finding the existence of an acute emergency, despite the
legislative declaration that such a situation did exist. The
defense having relied upon the decision in Culp v. Chestertown6" and Opinion of the Attorney General,6 Judge Gray
drew the same distinction between Culp v. Chestertown as
had the Court of Appeals in the opinion previously discussed. He held:
"... that when an act passed at the short session is
attacked on the ground that it does not relate to an
acute emergency the Court is bound to inquire and to
determine whether or not as a matter of fact such an
acute emergency does exist, although, of course, the act
is entitled to a presumption of validity by reason of its
passage by the General Assembly.""2
In summing up, the Court stated:
"Our conclusion is that there would be considerable
doubt as to whether an emergency existed at all in the
Md. Laws 1950, CM. 32, p. 286.
O
1 Supra, n. 17.
Supra, n. 13.
Supra, n. 58.
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constitutional sense.. ., but certainly one can not treat
this situation as creating an acute emergency as required in the present constitutional provision. If there
is an emergency it is chronic rather than acute. The
facts set up as a reason for the emergency legislation
now under attack do not measure up to the standard
required by the constitutional limitation on the power
of the General Assembly at its 'short' session. The court
is compelled to hold that the presumption to which an
act of the General Assembly is entitled is overcome by
the actual facts demonstrated in this case. Chapter 32
of the Acts of 1950 is declared to be beyond the scope of
the legislation permitted at the short session of the
Legislature and accordingly is unconstitutional and
void."
No appeal was taken from this decree.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The judicial interpretation rendered after the adjournment of the 1950 Session of the General Assembly will give
valuable assistance to subsequent even-year sessions. The
1950 Session had only the Opinion of the Attorney General
as a guide in determining the type of legislation that would
be acceptable. This opinion has since been almost completely repudiated by the Courts.
The air of confusion that surrounded the 1950 Session
should be dispelled and legislation can now fall into clear
and distinct patterns which have been established by judicial precedent. In all cases the holdings of the Courts have
strengthened and defined the constitutional limitations.
Subsequent short sessions should be more orderly, the calendars should be lighter, and deliberation should be less
hurried. The volume of legislation should be considerably
reduced.
Despite the fact that the Courts have drawn clear lines
as to qualifications, the function of the Rules Committees
in both Houses should be maintained. These Committees
can render very valuable contributions to the success of the
thirty-day Sessions and with clearly established limitations,
their screening process should be less arduous. However,
responsibility cannot be entirely assumed by these committees, as a bill is always subject to amendment after it has
been screened through the Rules Committee, and this responsibility must be shared by the General Assembly as a
whole.
Ibid.
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Subsequent rulings of the Courts should tend toward a
more strict construction of the constitutional provision, and
a resulting more close adherence to what appears to be the
intent and purpose of creating the even-year meeting of the
General Assembly.
In summation, the General Assembly would seem to be
safe in enacting, in its thirty-day sessions in even-years the
following types of legislation, within the limits prescribed
by the Court of Appeals:
"(1) Bills having to do with budgetary, revenue,
and financial matters of the State Government."
This section has not been ruled upon directly by the
Courts, but its wording is so clear and distinct as to offer
little difficulty. This, of course, means an annual enactment
of the State budget. Any other financial matter must deal
with the State Government in order to qualify. Financial
matters of the government of a local political subdivision
are excluded under this section.
"(2) Legislation dealing with an acute emergency."
The Court of Appeals has ruled that, in order for legislation to qualify under this section, an acute emergency must
exist in fact. A legislative declaration of such a condition,
while prima facie evidence of an acute emergency, is not
conclusive and is subject to review by the Court.
"(3) Legislation in the general public welfare."
"General public welfare" means the welfare of the entire
State. If one of the twenty-three counties or the City of
Baltimore is exempted from the operation of an enactment,
that statute ceases to come within the general public welfare. The labeling of an act as a "Public General Law" will
not satisfy this section if the act itself does not actually pertain to the State as a whole. The Court reserves the right
to look behind the title of the act in order to determine
whether it has application to the entire State.
It seems likely, however, that borderline situations may
from time to time develop in the future which may require
additional interpretation.

